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The subject of recognition is an elusive one in international law and little discussed by 
international historians.1 Yet, it is basic to the way relations are conducted between 
states. Put simply, they cannot easily communicate if they do not recognise one 
another’s existence.  The question is elusive because, despite a few generally accepted 
rules, such as not withdrawing recognition once it is given – though even that has had 
its exceptions – in practice governments may take their own subjective, pragmatic and 
sometimes contradictory approach to the question. Decisions are shaped by such 
diverse factors as historical practice, current political expediency and predictions 
about the durability of any would-be regime. One important difference in twentieth 
century practice was between those countries, including Britain down to 1980, which 
extended recognition to particular governments and those that prefered to focus 
simply on the recognition of states. In February 1967 the Foreign Secretary, George 
Brown, summed up the then-British policy as follows: 
The general practice which Her Majesty’s Government have followed… is to 
recognise de jure a Government, established by revolutionary action, when 
Her Majesty’s Government considers that the new Government enjoys, with a 
reasonable prospect of permanence, the obedience of the mass of the 
population and the effective control of much the greater part of the territory of 
the State concerned.2  
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However, on 28 April 1980 one of Brown’s successors, Lord Carrington, 
announced a fundamental change in British practice. Based on a review first 
announced to parliament soon after Margaret Thatcher’s government took office, ‘we 
have decided that we shall no longer accord recognition to Governments.’ Henceforth, 
the British would ‘recognise States in accordance with common international 
doctrine.’3 This reform followed several years of discussion within the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), a discussion which was influenced by particular 
problems over recognition and by membership of the European Community (EC), 
most of whose members already recognised ‘states not governments’. This article 
investigates how and why such a change in British practice came about. 
 
British Practice before 1973 
The British criteria for recognition, both before and after Carrington’s announcement, 
revolved not around moral questions like human rights or respect for liberal values, 
but around practical questions about who held effective power in a particular state. 
Hence, in Brown’s 1967 statement, emphasis was laid upon three factors: ‘effective 
control’ of territory, the ‘obedience of the mass of the population’ and the assurance 
of a ‘reasonable prospect of permanence’ fro the regime. In essence, London wanted 
to know whom it should deal with on such everyday, practical questions as 
commercial exchanges, debt repayment, legal obligations and the protection of British 
citizens. Under pre-1980 practice, it was certainly not necessary to renew recognition 
with every change of government, so long as these changes were made in a 
constitutional fashion. However, unconstitutional changes, such as those brought 
about by the overthrow of a monarchy or by a military coup (the latter an increasing 
problem in the 1960s), did call for a decision on whether to conduct business with the 
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new regime. Notwithstanding the complex debate surrounding such cases, the way 
recognition was given effect was surprisingly simple: there was no ceremony or 
special document; London simply began to conduct normal diplomatic 
correspondence with whatever authority it recognised. In most cases, there was little 
debate about who to recognise, because there was little debate about who held power. 
This was so even when the British could have little liking for the change of 
government. Thus, in early 1966 London quickly decided to maintain relations with 
the military government of Nigeria, which had just ousted the Commonwealth 
country’s post-independence civilian government in a particularly violent coup.4 But 
there were cases when a decision was not so swift. 
 
Sometimes there was room for debate over the fundamental question of 
whether a change of leadership was indeed ‘unconstitutional’. When the military 
seized power in Greece in April 1967, for example, the question of recognition was 
posed, but most Western countries continued to deal with Athens because the head of 
state, King Constantine, remained in place. Here, the fact that Greece was a fellow 
member of NATO undoubtedly influenced the decision to work with the Colonels 
who had seized power; in any case, whatever the popular concern that events aroused 
in Britain, the junta clearly had control of the country’s territory and population.5 
Constantine’s banishment in December 1967 led to a much more prolonged debate 
over the issue of recognition. But, again, there was soon no doubt that the Colonels 
controlled Greece and, barely a month later, London decided ‘to resume doing 
business’ with them.6 In other instances, there was a prolonged period of doubt about 
whether a new regime had a secure hold over its territory and population. This was 
especially true in cases where a civil war broke out. For example, when Imam 
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Mohammed Al-Badr of the Yemen was overthrown in 1962, London refused to 
recognise the new republican regime because, while it apparently commanded the 
obedience of most of the population, Al-Badr himself escaped and began a counter-
insurgency.7  Sometimes the debate surrounding a decision could become very 
complex. When Bangladesh, with Indian military support, declared its independence 
from Pakistan in 1971-2 there was soon little doubt that the new government had firm 
control of its territory and the obedience of its population. However, London was 
reluctant to offend the Pakistan, a Commonwealth member and close ally of the 
United States. Recognition of the new state was delayed for several weeks, until well 
after the FCO’s usual criteria for recognition had been fulfilled.8  
 
Clearly, albeit to a limited extent, recognition might be used as a political 
weapon, to express approval or disapproval of a new regime, and perhaps to influence 
its policies. But in most cases the United Kingdom did not let ideological or moral 
questions affect recognition. In May 1975, for example, there was hardly any debate 
about recognising the extremist Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia, which had 
toppled the pro-Western Lon Nol.9 Nonetheless, ‘normal’ practice often had its 
exceptions. During the post-war period, the Cold War had a particular impact on 
British behaviour. London did not recognise such Communist regimes as East 
Germany, North Korea and North Vietnam in the 1960s even though they had firm 
control over a precisely-defined territory. These three cases involved recognition not 
of a government of course, but of a state that claimed to have an independent 
existence, and in all three instances there was another, pro-Western state 
(respectively, West Germany, South Korea and South Vietnam) that claimed to be the 
sole legitimate government of the contested territory. This raised complex legal issues 
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and London would have been unusual indeed if it had broken ranks with the rest of 
the Western alliance and recognised any of these ‘states’. However, Britain entered 
into diplomatic relations with North Vietnam and East Germany in 1973-4, helped by 
the end of the Vietnam War in the first case and by progress on East-West détente in 
the second. It did so with the approval of the US, West Germany and other allies, a 
point that shows how the behaviour of other states might influence British thinking.  
 
Another regular consideration in British policy was the well-being of the 
Commonwealth, which faced numerous changes of regime in member states by the 
1960s. Significantly, a 1967 Commonwealth Office memorandum noted that Britain 
‘consistently sought to avoid the formal recognition of new regimes after coups in 
Commonwealth states’, for a number of reasons. London did not want to seem to 
condone illegality, to back a particular political faction or to appear to interfere in 
domestic matters; above all, it wanted ‘to avoid too pointedly the charge… of having 
neo-colonialist or otherwise hostile motives.’ For the moment, London escaped such 
difficulties by waiting to see what other Commonwealth (or, in Africa, African) states 
did in recognising new regimes. The memorandum made no mention of a ‘states not 
governments’ approach as an alternative way out of the problem.10  
 
Of course, by the early 1970s British diplomats were well aware that many 
other governments followed the practice of recognising ‘states not governments.’ 
There was one powerful reason why this approach was increasingly adopted. It was 
felt, especially in the Third World, that recognition of particular governments was an 
insulting practice that smacked of interference in a country’s internal affairs. It 
amounted to ‘neo-colonialist’ behaviour. Latin Americans led the way, following 
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Mexico’s adoption of the so-called ‘Estrada Doctrine’ (named after its foreign 
minister) in 1931, largely because they resented American meddling in domestic 
politics throughout the Western Hemisphere. But FCO legal experts11 were strongly 
opposed to adopting the ‘states not governments’ approach and could be quite caustic 
about it. In February 1972 one of them, Sir Vincent Evans, claimed that he had yet to 
hear ‘any coherent explanation’ of it and that, ‘despite its superficial attraction’ it 
could not solve what he called ‘the problem of recognition…’ While agreeing the 
proposition that ‘each State’s choice of Government is an internal domestic matter’ he 
argued that this principle, in itself, did not help other States to identify who really held 
power. The question was an important one, legally and politically, because recognised 
governments had significant rights in the international sphere. They could sign 
treaties, obtain diplomatic immunities for their representatives and claim immunity 
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts. In most cases, the decision on recognition after 
a coup was easy enough but, where a ‘claimant appears insecure or there are rival 
claimants, the problem is more difficult…’ and there was a need for certain criteria to 
be used in helping a decision, such as those Britain used. For Evans, recognition of 
‘states not governments’ was ‘no more than the adoption of a practice which 
studiously avoid formal acts of recognition whenever possible, relying instead on 
recognition by implication.’12 The FCO lawyers became tenacious opponents of any 
change in British practice. 
 
Chile, Greece and European Community membership, 1973-4 
The seminal case that sparked intense debate in the FCO over the very basis of British 
practice on recognition was that of Chile. In September 1973 its President, Salvador 
Allende, was overthrown by the military under General Augusto Pinochet. The coup 
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provoked moral outrage throughout the West. Allende may have been a Marxist but 
he was also democratically-elected, whereas Pinochet’s regime immediately set out 
on a ruthless campaign to imprison or liquidate its opponents. There were numerous 
appeals from the British public not to recognise the new regime.13 Of course, such 
appeals were based on a belief that moral questions should influence decisions on 
recognition. But, as seen above, British criteria for recognition were based on more 
mundane principles and the FCO’s Latin American Department was clear that the 
Pinochet regime fulfilled the normal expectations. Arguments about morality, or the 
fact Allende was freely elected were beside the point. Pinochet now controlled the 
territory and its population, so he ought to be recognised, just as Britain had 
recognised other Latin American military regimes following recent coups in 
Argentina (1966), Peru (1968) and Ecuador (1972) – cases in which the Press and 
public had shown little interest.14 Although there was no duty under international law 
to recognise regimes, the British generally acted as though they were under an 
obligation to recognise once their criteria were met.15 
 
Significantly, when discussing the recognition of Pinochet’s regime the FCO 
decided to sound out their eight partners in the EC, which the Conservative 
government of Edward Heath had joined at the start of the year. Most of these already 
took a different approach to Britain on recognition, extending this to states not 
particular regimes. Having adopted this approach some years before, France was 
especially quick to enter into normal diplomatic contacts with Pinochet, avoiding 
discussion about whether and when to extend recognition. Following the public 
outrage provoked by the Pinochet coup in Britain, the Foreign Secretary, Alec 
Douglas-Home, wanted to know from the FCO legal advisers – in ‘a very brief 
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answer’ rather than ‘a long legal treatise’ - whether it was possible to ‘move to the 
French system thereby avoiding a lot of… heart searching whenever a change of 
regime takes place…’.16 Of course, Vincent Evans had already made his views on the 
French system clear the previous February and his minute was sent to Douglas-Home 
by way of response. One of the Legal Counsellors, Fred Burrows, added, in a 
covering note, that even ‘the French position is not really very different from our 
own’ because, after any violent change of regime, Paris still had to decide who was in 
control of a state. ‘The only difference is that the French… have decided not to call it 
“recognition” This may, or may not, help them to avoid answering awkward questions 
in the initial stages, but it does not enable them to avoid taking decisions’ on 
recognition.’17  
 
Burrows clearly had little time for the French approach, yet he had touched on 
a key point when he wrote that the French were able, by their practice, to ‘avoid 
answering awkward questions in the initial stages.’ It was a point that seemed 
increasingly important to British diplomats in the field. As one pointed out: 
whatever the legal arguments are, the fact is that we find that the act of 
“recognition” attracts more attention and therefore more political difficulties 
than it does in other countries of NATO… I agree that changing our policy to 
recognition of “States” not “Government” is, in fact, when analysed, mere 
semantics without any practical meaning, but if it would make it easier for us 
to avoid a formal “Act of Recognition”, why not adopt it? 18 
Robin Hooper, the Ambassador to Athens, was another official who felt it worth 
looking at a change of practice because it seemed so much easier to avoid 
controversies by following the ‘states not governments’ approach. Hooper had 
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recently been through another agonised debate about a constitutional change in 
Greece (the third since April 1967) when, in June 1973, the military junta finally 
abolished the Greek monarchy. This had stirred up more complaints from the Press 
about dealing with a dictatorship but, yet again, the junta fulfilled the British criteria 
for recognition.  The British consulted their EC allies on the point only to find that 
most did not consider there was an issue of recognition. Significantly, after this EC 
consultation, Hooper was instructed by the FCO to ‘play down the recognition aspect’ 
in any public dealings and even to ‘avoid using the word’ recognition.19 Then, in 
November, the junta underwent an internal coup, which led to another change of 
leadership. London again consulted its EC partners and again found that, because they 
recognised ‘states not governments’, the issue of recognition did not arise. Denmark 
alone, it seemed, shared the British approach. As an official in the Southern Europe 
Department noted, British policy was to recognise ‘the people in power as soon as we 
are sure they are firmly in the saddle, whether we like them or not.’ It was supposed 
to be a practical question about where power rested, not a moral one about their 
conduct. But the debate that followed any ‘unconstitutional’ change of regime drew 
attention to the fact that Britain was choosing to deal with unsavoury characters. The 
‘states not governments formula’, by seeming to sidestep the issue of choice, ‘avoids 
the criticisms which the British policy attracts.’20  
 
 Such concerns led Douglas-Home to request another, fuller submission on 
what he called ‘the French doctrine of recognition.’21 However, despite the rising 
crescendo of concern from their Diplomatic Service colleagues, the FCO legal team 
continued to express deep scepticism about a possible change of policy, in caustic 
tones similar to those used by Evans. An initial response by one of the Legal 
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Counsellors, Ian Sinclair, dismissed ‘the so-called French doctrine’ as ‘neither 
coherent nor rational.’ French practice after a coup was to resume diplomatic business 
only after the situation in a state had stabilised and it was clear who held authority. 
‘This is almost indistinguishable from our own practice…, the only difference being 
that we regard the resumption of business… as constituting an act of recognition.’ 
Neither was it clear how the French practice helped in a situation of civil war, where 
two authorities claimed to be the legal government of a state. Sinclair amplified 
Evans’ point that recognition carried with it serious legal consequences. For example, 
in actions before the British courts, a recognised government could claim immunity 
against civil proceedings and claim title to property held by its predecessors. The 
FCO, when requested, issued legally binding certificates to the courts, stating the date 
from which foreign governments were recognised. He pointed out that at least one 
eminent French international lawyer, Professor Charles Rousseau, was ‘scornful’ of 
the ‘states not government’ approach and also that United States policy, which had 
‘previously given much greater weight to political considerations’ had moved closer 
to British practice in recent years. Furthermore, whatever the ‘superficial’ attraction 
of French practice, if Britain adopted it, it this would not guarantee that controversies 
could be avoided, because ‘we would be bound in any event, if pressed, to concede… 
that the act of resuming diplomatic links amount to tacit recognition.’ 
 
Ministers were not put off by such a quick-fire response and, in reply to 
Sinclair’s minute, Anthony Royle, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, asked 
for a full report about the practice of other EC members who claimed to follow the 
‘states not government’ formula.22 This led to several weeks of study. The position 
was, to say the least, confused. For example, despite what had happened after the 
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latest coup in Athens, when the British embassy believed the Germans followed a 
‘states not governments’ approach, Sinclair pointed to a report by the legal adviser to 
Britain’s Bonn embassy, which insisted that ‘Germany does require to accord 
recognition, but it may be done informally.’ Belgian practice was felt to be 
ambiguous, while Denmark was understood to follow British practice.23 In contrast, 
the Southern European Department, which had recently had to deal with the 
unconstitutional changes in Greece, was confident that all the EC members other than 
Denmark (and including West Germany) followed a ‘states not government’ line. 
Reporting on this, one of its members, Robert Cornish, pointed to criticism of recent 
British decisions on recognition in Parliament and the media. He argued that London 
could be ‘left out on a limb’ in relation to its EC partners and added his opinion that 
the majority practice ‘makes good sense.’24  
 
Others took a different view. In early January 1974, a brief report about Italian 
and Dutch practice was produced by the FCO’s Research Department, based on a 
number of recent case studies of recognition. Despite its factual nature, this gave 
weight to the legal advisers’ case. For example, while both countries seemed to 
recognise ‘states not governments’, they had to wait until a situations had settled 
down after a coup, had to decide on the precise timing of any resumption of 
diplomatic business and had found that dealing with the Pinochet regime sparked 
bitter public controversy.25 Sinclair felt there was clear evidence that the Italians ‘do 
attach significance to the formal act of acknowledging a note from a new regime’, 
while the Dutch presented ‘a case where lip-service may be paid to the French 
doctrine but where in practice the same problems are encountered’ as Britain.26 For 
the moment this is where the discussion rested, no submission to the Foreign 
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Secretary being possible before the Heath government lost office in the hastily-called 
election of February 1974. However, it was clear that the debate surrounding 
recognition was unlikely to fade away. As Colin Warbrick has argued, the growing 
number of independent states in the world inevitably meant ‘the increasing frequency 
of irregular change of government’ and it became ‘progressively harder for the British 
government to maintain successfully that its recognition of the new authorities [was] a 
technical and neutral operation.’ Greece and Chile were only the most difficult cases 
where the British recognised a new regime ‘despite the constitutional illegitimacy of 
their coming [to] power and the political antipathy with which they were regarded.’ 
Other countries faced the same challenge, of course, and they too were shifting their 
practice. France had been quick off the mark with its variation of the Estrada doctrine. 
But also, the United States, which had previously been quite blatant in its use of 
recognition almost as a political weapon, now tended to accept new regimes after a 
short time without making much of the formal recognition process.27 
 
The Debate under Labour, 1974-9. 
Douglas-Home’s departure did not bring any respite for the legal advisers. Instead, the 
Foreign Secretary of the incoming Labour administration, James Callaghan, also 
asked for a report on French practice.28 Nonetheless, Evans continued doggedly to 
defend existing British practice. Repeating his earlier arguments, but at greater length, 
in a minute of 22 May 1974 he underlined that British policy was akin to that 
followed by Washington and Commonwealth countries. The ‘French doctrine’ was 
‘legally unsound and… unworkable save in straightforward cases’ and, while other 
EC members might claim to use the ‘states not governments’ formula, they often 
differed among themselves about  timing diplomatic contacts with new regimes. 
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Indeed, having obtained fuller information on EC practice since the New Year, Evans 
now believed that only Belgium and Luxembourg actually followed ‘French’ practice, 
though he acknowledged that not all British diplomats shared his interpretation. A 
telegram from the Lisbon embassy, for example, in the wake of the ‘Carnation 
Revolution’ that overthrew Portugal’s long-running dictatorship in April, reported that 
all EC members ‘except ourselves share the French policy…’ Evans also underlined 
his arguments that a failure to be clear about recognition would ‘in effect to the 
Courts a responsibility which has hitherto been exercised by the Secretary of State’, 
because some legal cases could turn on the question of which government Britain 
recognised at any given time.29  
 
Evans’ views seem largely to have satisfied Labour ministers, but not Britain’s 
diplomats.30 In September 1974, John Leahy of the Paris embassy launched 
something of a campaign in favour of ‘French’ policy influenced by the latest 
recognition controversy, when Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was overthrown by 
the military. For Leahy, the French seemed to escape criticism of their actions, 
whether it was a question of recognising governments (when ‘the problem of 
recognition does not arise for them’) or, as over Bangladesh, states (when ‘they attach 
great importance to… a declaration being made at the same time by the Nine [that is, 
the members of the EC]. This has the obvious advantage of diminishing the 
resentment which such a decision may cause other governments’). The seriousness 
with which Leahy viewed this issue was emphasised by his writing to the Assistant 
Under-Secretary, James Cable, rather than to the Western Department. There was a 
heavy hint in the letter that other diplomats felt the same: ‘I cannot help feeling that 
the French practice would be regarded by most of our Ambassadors… as a welcome 
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escape from the political dilemma about timing…’ And it was clear that Leahy knew 
where his main opponents were, with his remark that, ‘I realise that our criteria for 
recognition may have earned a permanent place in the hearts of our lawyers…’31  
 
Cable initially tried to meet these arguments with a short summary of Evans’ 
arguments, but Leahy was determined to persevere. He produced telegrams from The 
Hague and Bonn suggesting that the Netherlands and West Germany both recognised 
‘states not governments’, and he accused Evans of being ‘a trifle cavalier’ in his 
dismissal of the practice.32 This forced a rather longer riposte from Cable, together 
with a full copy of Evans’ minute of 22 May and a request for Leahy to find out more 
about French practice.33 This Leahy was quite willing to do; or rather one of his 
colleagues, Robin Renwick did so, calling on the Deputy Legal Adviser at the Quai 
d’Orsay. The latter insisted that the new French practice of recognising ‘states not 
governments’ was much better than the ‘classical’ one and even felt that British and 
French policy was growing closer together, ‘as we seemed equally concerned to get 
away from the formal and solemn character of according recognition…’ The main 
difference was that London still insisted on publicly confirming that recognition had 
occurred. As to political co-operation in the EC, ‘the doctrinal differences did not 
matter much’, as long as there was co-operation over the timing of a resumption of 
business with a new regime.34 But, for Sinclair, French policy was still ‘illogical’ and 
could not deal easily with situations where two authorities claimed jurisdiction over 
the same territory; and he wrote to Leahy on these lines.35  
 
Leahy, as he recognised, was not without support among diplomats on the 
ground. Staff at the embassy in Addis Ababa, who had had to handle Haile Selassie’s 
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downfall, remarked in November 1974 on the fact that their EC partners seemed ‘free 
from any pressure to make any dramatic once for all decision.’36 Only weeks later, 
however, came more evidence in support of Evans. The new military regime faced a 
violent internal split, leading to numerous executions. No-one considered that this 
involved any issue of recognition, but the French and others wanted to signal their 
abhorrence of events, so there was a concerted suspension of EC diplomatic contacts 
with Addis Ababa. Paris, it seemed, in its dealings with other regimes could, 
sometimes, be moved by moral considerations.37 In any case, by the end of 1974 
Leahy appears to have given up on his campaign to change FCO thinking. For the rest 
of the Labour government the debate over recognition faded away, helped no doubt 
by the absence of major controversies equivalent to Chile or Greece.  
 
It is significant that events continued to move against Britain where any 
debates did occur. In May 1978, for example, when the Comorian government was 
overthrown, the British refused to extend recognition because the new regime was 
installed by white mercenaries and lacked popular obedience, but even Denmark now 
seemed to have adopted the ‘states not governments’ approach and Britain was 
increasingly isolated within the European Community on such questions.38 
Nonetheless, the FCO legal advisers stuck doggedly to their established line. In 1978, 
when debate raged over the possible recognition of Namibia, Sir Ian Sinclair wrote 
that British policy had ‘very considerable long-term advantages’ because it was based 
upon ‘more or less objective criteria’ rather than upon political bias.39  
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Reform under Thatcher stalls, June-September 1979 
The announcement of a full-scale review of British practice was made by Ian 
Gilmour, Lord Privy Seal, in the House of Commons on 18 June 1979, in the context 
of questions about a violent change of government in Ghana, a Commonwealth state. 
Gilmour was the principal government spokesperson on international affairs in the 
House of Commons because the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, sat in the Lords. 
The Lord Privy Seal explained that London had recognised the new government of 
Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings once it satisfied Britain’s usual criteria. But MPs on 
both sides of the House were concerned that Rawlings and his Revolutionary Council 
had subsequently executed a number of leading Ghanaians, and threatened to kill 
more. It was a Conservative MP, Jonathan Aitken, who questioned Britain’s existing 
criteria for recognition and won a promise that these would be re-examined. While 
stating his own opinion that ‘our criteria for recognition have placed us in 
considerable difficulties’, Gilmour added, on advice from one of the FCO legal team, 
that ‘the alternatives also have disadvantages. I am told that virtually all Governments 
since 1950 have looked at the matter and have not altered the criteria.’40  
 
The following day, steps began within the Office to carry out the review, with 
ministers agreeing that Gilmour should lead it. Typically, when Sinclair was asked to 
comment on the review, he continued to put the same arguments that had been used 
against the ‘states not governments’ formula for years. The actual difference between 
Britain and its EC partners was, he said, ‘pretty minimal’ and the British criteria were 
not ‘purely legal arguments’ but ‘serve an important political objective – namely that 
of securing consistency in our approach to recognition problems…’41 Yet, 
professional diplomats were still not convinced by the legal advisers’ approach. Two 
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officials scribbled impatiently on Sinclair’s minute, one complaining, ‘But our 
doctrine makes it less easy to fudge a decision’, the other pointing out that successive 
Foreign Secretaries saw problems with existing British practice, seeing it as 
‘unworkable.’42 In any case, Gilmour was not dissuaded from carrying out a review 
and he expressed doubts about Sinclair’s view that differences with the EC were 
‘pretty minimal’. The review was put in the hands of the FCO’s Planning Staff, which 
was asked to make comparisons to EC and US practice, and to look at any 
‘anomalies’ in British policy.43 
 
The Planning Staff were at work by the end of June, gathering evidence, 
reading various earlier memoranda and consulting closely with Sinclair. Meanwhile, 
on 3 July, in reply to another question from Aitken, the Prime Minister herself said 
she was ‘prepared to consider the criteria for recognition. There was considerable 
concern about the recognition of Ghana. The recognition was made just a few hours 
before all those terrible executions which I have continued totally and utterly to 
condemn.’44 By mid-July a draft paper was ready. This emphasised that the existing 
recognition criteria had the advantages of being objective, internally consistent and 
providing legal certainty about those who, in British eyes, legally held power in a 
foreign country. The disadvantages were that the public often believed recognition 
signified moral approval of a regime, that Britain sometimes felt obliged to extend 
recognition when delay would be politically more prudent, and that it was difficult to 
reach a common position with the rest of the EC. In contrast, a system that avoided 
express talk of ‘recognition’, would make it easier to avoid public controversy, yet a 
choice still had to be made about when to begin dealing with a new regime and this 
might continue to provoke criticism. In conclusion, the paper rejected the option of 
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recognising states, arguing that this would mark ‘a considerable break with British 
tradition.’ Instead, it came up with a compromise. London would continue to 
recognise governments but, so as to minimise the danger of public controversy, it 
would ‘do business with a new government abroad without taking a public position on 
the issue of recognition.’45  
 
Few in the FCO welcomed the draft paper’s recommendation. The News 
Department, rather than seeing the proposed change in policy as likely to make its job 
easier, feared journalists would simply alter their line of questioning, asking ‘Has HM 
Representative yet done business with the new regime?’ The suggested reform would 
also make decisions seem secretive and subject, perhaps, to moral judgements; it was 
better, therefore, to leave the current system alone.46 In contrast, most others objected 
the proposed reform because it simply did not go far enough. Brian Barder, head of 
the Southern African Department, led the charge. He could see no advantage in 
‘continuing to make decisions… by reference to present criteria but trying to keep 
quiet about them… Parliament and the press will soon extract the truth.’  It made far 
more sense to adopt French practice. D.A.S. Gladstone, of the Western European 
Department, wrote, ‘I see advantage in grasping the nettle more firmly and moving all 
the way towards the French system rather than stopping at the half-way house which 
you advocate.’ And a West Africa Department official, well used to dealing with the 
fallout from military coups, was just as blunt: ‘the time has come for us to standardise 
our procedures with the other EEC countries and so avoid being the odd man out.’47  
 
Similar doubts were strongly expressed at a meeting between the FCO Deputy 
Under-Secretaries and the Permanent Under-Secretary, Michael Palliser, to discuss 
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the draft paper. But Sinclair remained equally adamant against adopting French 
practice. He still believed that the British system was effective in most cases. There 
were only ‘one or two isolated instances’ of real problems. ‘[A] detailed analysis of 
what actually happens in… those countries which assert that they apply the French 
doctrine will reveal that there is just as much criticism of the way in which that 
doctrine is applied as there is here of the way in which our own policy is applied.’ It 
was therefore decided to consult British diplomatic posts around Europe, in order to 
clarify what difficulties there were with operating the French policy (for example, in 
dealing with Press enquiries and in handling legal disputes in the Courts) and to 
discover whether other capitals were indeed moving over to the French model.48  
 
A minute of 26 July by Rodric Braithwaite, head of the Planning Staff, 
suggested the lawyers were very much on the defensive at this point. Braithwaite 
noted that there was ‘a strong trend of opinion in the Office in favour of adopting the 
French policy of recognising States, not Governments; and our Ministers also seem to 
favour that.’ Even Braithwaite could ‘not understand all’ Sinclair’s arguments, such 
as why the French should have more trouble than Britain in deciding which side to 
recognise in a civil war.49 Another violent change of regime, the overthrow of 
President Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua by the Sandinista movement, created more 
momentum for change. At first, Thatcher, rather than formally extending recognition 
to the new regime, hoped simply to ‘establish contact’ with it, as the French and 
others intended to do. The FCO felt that they had to grant recognition according to 
existing policy and Thatcher allowed herself to be persuaded of this, but the episode 
again suggested that Downing Street wanted a change of practice.50 Gilmour, 
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meanwhile, minuted on 31 July, ‘I remain convinced that change is desirable, but I 
think we can let events take their course.’51  
 
However, as responses came in from European posts to the Planning Staff’s 
enquiries, about recognition, it was clear that there were more differences around 
Europe on recognition than British diplomats hitherto believed and this gave 
ammunition to the lawyers. The Italians followed French practice and the only serious 
recent problem with this concerned Pinochet’s coup in Chile, which had aroused the 
ire of the Left. In practice, when deciding the point at which to do business with a 
new regime, Italy used criteria similar to London’s (such as whether a new regime 
controlled a territory and its population) but it also put special emphasis on the need 
to achieve EC joint action.52 Belgium, too, as had long been understood, was close to 
French practice.53 Ireland, with a few exceptions, such as when it entered into 
relations with Communist China in 1972, followed the ‘states not governments’ 
formula.54 But the West Germans operated more elastic system than France and 
agreed with Britain that a decision had to be made on when to deal with a new regime. 
Whereas the Germans expressly recognised new states, they avoided any public talk 
of recognising governments.55 Only the Dutch, who had previously been seen as 
following the ‘states not government’ formula, seemed to operate a system close to 
Britain’s and shared Sinclair’s disparagement of the French.56 Then again, Denmark, 
while it had tried to move to a ‘states not governments’ approach, still had much in 
common with British practice when it came to doing business with new regimes and 
was marked by ‘deliberate obfuscation.’57 Significantly, the French agreed that their 
own policy was not flawless (as when there were two claimants to power) and that 
there was a need to decide when to renew contacts after a violent change of regime (in 
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which case they used criteria similar to London’s). But they felt their system worked 
well in most cases, that there was little questioning from Press and Parliament, and 
that no serious legal complications arose, even though the Courts sometimes acted 
without guidance from the French government in deciding who held authority in 
another state.58 
 
By late August 1979, in light of the views from within the FCO and of the 
responses from European posts, the Planning Staff had substantially redrafted their 
earlier memorandum and now made a different policy recommendation, which 
brought it ‘more closely into line with the French formula.’ Britain ‘should retain our 
present criteria for deciding whether to enter into diplomatic relations with a new 
government’ but ‘should also play down the importance attached to the word 
“recognition” by declaring that we will in future “formally recognise states not 
governments”.’59 However, this suggestion still did not win universal support. The 
News Department, while it would not stand in the way of the reform, still preferred to 
stay with existing policy, though it also wanted to launch a public campaign to 
explain that recognition of a regime did not signify moral approval of it. The Press 
might ‘poke fun at the sophistry of distinguishing between formal and informal 
recognition.’60 More predictable was the opposition from Sinclair, who also wanted to 
stand by the status quo. He argued that, ‘The proposed changes are entirely cosmetic 
and would… [expose] us to charges of hypocrisy and evasion.’61  
 
In reporting to the PUS, Braithwaite was almost despairing in the face of the 
continuing disagreements. He still personally felt that the French approach was the 
‘most convenient politically’, but ‘it is no more than a piece of obfuscation’ and 
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‘almost everybody holds strong and contradictory opinions about it.’62 The sense of 
despair perhaps explain why, at another meeting between Palliser and the Deputy 
Under-Secretaries, it was decided to revise the Planning Staff paper so that it set out 
the advantages and disadvantages of British and French practice, without any 
recommendation on reform. This was submitted to Gilmour on 25 September, with a 
covering note from Palliser in which he was, ‘on balance, in favour of sticking with 
our present doctrine, while improving our management of it.’ He argued this for a 
number of reasons. First, given the nature of the British Press and Parliament, he 
believed they would continue to be interested in knowing the precise point at which 
Britain entered into relations with a new regime. ‘When we enter into relations with 
an unpleasant regime, our critics object not to “recognition” as such, but to our having 
any dealings at all with thugs, fanatics, or other undesirables.’ Secondly, he doubted 
that common EC action would ‘shield us from criticism’ since, ‘Previous attempts to 
co-ordinate the dealings of the Nine with new regimes have foundered because of 
tacit competition amongst the Europeans, each anxious to extract the maximum credit 
for itself.’ Finally, Palliser believed that it would be possible to manage the existing 
system better by improved public presentation, ‘playing down the loaded word 
“recognition”’ and being more flexible over the timing of first dealings with a new 
regime.63 
 
Reform Achieved, October 1979-April 1980 
Gilmour did not reply to Palliser for three weeks but, when he did so, his 
dissatisfaction with the situation was clear. He not only argued that ‘our present 
practice occasionally leads to considerable embarrassment’, but also that French 
practice ‘works well and is followed by most of our Community partners with 
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success’ and he believed that Parliament would accept the change.64 There were 
differences of view, however, even within ministerial ranks, with one Minister of 
State, Douglas Hurd, supporting Gilmour, while another, Nicholas Ridley, along with 
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Richard Luce, was sympathetic to Palliser. It was 
agreed to hold a meeting between Gilmour, Palliser and Sinclair but, thanks to the 
pressure of other business, there is no record of such a meeting being held for several 
weeks.65  
 
In the interim, cutting across the debate on the Planning Staff memorandum, 
there was an unusual discussion surrounding Cambodia, from which the government 
of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge was driven out at the start of the year, after a 
Vietnamese invasion. The British continued to recognise Pol Pot, because the 
alternative was to do business with the Vietnamese-installed regime of Heng Samrin 
which, it could be argued, was no more than a puppet. However, as evidence mounted 
of the genocide carried out by the Khmer Rouge, Conservative ministers, including 
Gilmour, were increasingly unhappy with this situation, and it attracted considerable 
public and parliamentary criticism. The problem was complicated by the fact that 
China, which the British did not want to upset, continued to recognise Pol Pot. 
Furthermore, it was almost unprecedented to withdraw recognition from a 
government without recognising a successor, whereas there were plenty of examples 
of the British continuing to recognise governments-in-exile (as with many European 
governments during the Second World War).66 Yet, following intense debate, 
Gilmour told the Commons on 6 December that ‘we can no longer regard Pol Pot as 
leading an effective Government in Cambodia’, adding ‘Our position is that there is 
no Government in Cambodia whom we can recognise.’ In a sense, this was in line 
 24 
with existing British practice, in that Pol Pot had failed to fulfil the criteria of having 
effective control of the country he claimed to rule. The British continued to recognise 
the state of Cambodia, but not any government there.67 But withdrawal of recognition 
was a highly unusual step. The Cambodian case confirmed the fact that issues of 
recognition continued to generate crises.  
 
The last case of a violent change of regime before ministers decided to reform 
policy, came when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979, installing 
a new President, Babrak Karmal. As with Heng Samrin in Cambodia, the British 
refused this foreign-installed regime recognition. One of the legal team, Tony Aust, 
argued that this was not because of the military intervention, but because the regime 
was ‘still wholly dependent for its authority on the presence of Soviet troops.’68 
Around the same time that this position was established, FCO ministers decided, in a 
meeting whose record has not survived, that they ‘would now take steps to change… 
policy on Recognition.’ Gilmour discussed this with Palliser and Sinclair and, on 11 
January, the Lord Privy Seal requested that a parliamentary statement be prepared in 
the form of an ‘inspired’ question from a friendly MP, with a ministerial answer. The 
answer ‘should concentrate on the thesis that the Government had examined the 
question carefully and had decided that the time had come for a change in policy.’ It 
should draw attention to the problems with existing policy and ‘conclude that we had 
decided to move closer to the position of a number of friendly countries whose policy 
was to recognise States not Governments.’69  
 
The task of drafting the question and answer did not prove easy. In making a 
first attempt, Sinclair was typically cautious. Anxious to avoid giving any ‘hostages to 
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fortune’ on Cambodia, Afghanistan or other potential issues, he produced a carefully-
worded ministerial statement. This said, among other points, that British practice was 
already ‘broadly followed’ by its EC partners and that, in moving away from the 
formal recognition of governments, the FCO ‘do not intend to modify our practice by 
departing from the application of our basic criteria’ on recognition. The tone of the 
draft suggested that current policy was not so much flawed as misunderstood. 
Furthermore, for the sake of clarity in British courts, Sinclair wanted to be clear ‘as to 
whether we “recognised” an entity as a Government on a particular date.’70 The 
Planning Staff felt this last point made for ‘a weak conclusion’ to the draft statement, 
but the most Sinclair would offer was to re-order his sentences and the Planning Staff 
accepted this.71 Yet again, it was left to ministers to press a more purposeful 
approach.  
 
When the Foreign Secretary saw the draft answer, he was very disappointed. 
He complained that it read ‘more like an FCO minute than a statement for Parliament 
and the public’; and he wanted to bring out ‘the essential point, namely that our 
present policy… leads to embarrassing decisions.’72 Gilmour then made revisions to 
Sinclair’s document, acknowledging that existing policy had sometimes ‘aroused 
criticism and been interpreted, despite explanations to the contrary, as implying 
approval or disapproval’, which created controversies that ‘it is in our interests to 
avoid.’73 But, when Gilmour’s re-draft went before a meeting of FCO ministers, the 
Foreign Secretary feared that it went too far. By being so ‘frank’ about its desire ‘to 
avoid embarrassment in difficult cases’, it might open the government to criticism.74 
This led to further re-drafting during March and early April, in which the Planning 
Staff tried to simplify the parliamentary answer in line with ministers’ wishes and 
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Sinclair continued to press for a statement that safeguarded legal necessities. At one 
point during this marathon, Gilmour feared being left with a document where the 
arguments were ‘reduced to the point of incomprehensibility.’75 But eventually, in 
mid-May, he was able to submit the new policy to the Prime Minister. On the one 
hand, Britain would continue to refer to existing criteria when deciding ‘whether a 
new regime qualifies to be treated as the Government of a State’. On the other, it 
would move towards the practice of ‘our partners, which leaves the question of 
whether or not we acknowledge new regimes to be inferred from the nature of our 
dealings with them, instead of making a formal announcement of “recognition”.’ 
Thatcher quickly gave her approval and Carrington then issued his statement.76 
Several years of fiercely contested debate had finally come to an end. 
 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the decision to change Britain’s long-standing practice, and recognise 
‘states not governments’, was less dramatic than it appeared. As Colin Warbrick has 
noted, London continued to enter into dealings with regimes that came to power 
unconstitutionally only in the light of their ability to maintain effective control of a 
territory and population. ‘On the face of the statement, not much [had] changed.’77 
Carrington declared, ‘we shall continue to decide the nature of our dealings with 
regimes which come to power unconstitutionally in the light of our assessment of 
whether they are able of themselves to exercise effective control of the territory of the 
state concerned, and seem likely to do so.’78 While this said nothing about having the 
loyalty of most of the population, it was very close to Britain’s previous practice 
regarding the recognition of governments. An internal FCO memorandum 
acknowledged that, ‘practical questions of deciding what dealings to have with a new 
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government will remain much the same whether or not we “recognise” it’ and it 
recommended that past precedents in British practice would continue to be 
‘instructive’.79 Nor did the change in practice affect any of the existing cases where 
London either refused to recognise the existence of a state (such as North Korea) or to 
deal with a particular regime (such as Cambodia or Afghanistan).80 
 
Yet it would be wrong to brush the reform off as a distinction without a 
difference. The difference resided in the ability of the British government to deal with 
other States on a practical basis, free of the public outcry that followed the recognition 
of an Allende or a Rawlings. As Carrington explained, past practice of formally 
‘recognising’ a new government had ‘sometimes been misunderstood and… 
interpreted as meaning approval.’81 Also, there was immediate evidence that the new 
policy worked well in the sense of minimising chances for British embarrassment. 
Just before Carrington’s statement, there was a military coup in Liberia, led by 
Sergeant Samuel Doe, with a bloody aftermath strikingly similar to that in Ghana the 
previous year. However, the British maintained relations with Liberia without any 
announcement on recognition. When a military takeover occured in Bolivia in July, 
London continued to act as though nothing had happened and, in September, when 
there was a coup in Turkey, the EC acted together to express concern, but without 
withdrawing their ambassadors.82  
 
The FCO took time to draft some detailed, practical advice to its posts on how 
to interpret the new policy when an unconstitutional change of regime occurred.83 But 
there were soon signs that diplomats were grateful for reform. Reflecting on events in 
Liberia, the FCO’s West African Department felt the new policy was ‘of great value 
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to us’. For example, it allowed the embassy in Monrovia to take up cases of 
harassment of British citizens at an early date, whereas the previous policy might have 
made such dealings difficult.84 Britain’s High Commissioner in Guyana, who lived 
through a coup in August 1980, found the new policy, as expressed in Gilmour’s 
Commons statement, to be ‘perfectly clear’ and helpful.85 Not everyone was happy. 
One MP, Stephen Dorrell, complained that adopting ‘continental practice… helps us 
not at all’, because it did not solve the problem of who to deal with in Cambodia. But, 
it was pointed out to him that circumstances of ‘competing regimes’, as in Cambodia, 
were comparatively rare; the new policy was a real improvement in case where ‘a 
regime comes unconstitutionally to power and attracts public repugnance in the 
UK.’86 Sinclair remained concerned about the question of British courts forming a 
judgement on who exactly was, or was not, recognised. But this concern was met by 
his own insistence that any document ‘dealing with the interpretation of the new 
policy or with any other question which may arise in implementing it’, must be seen 
in draft form and approved by the legal advisers.87 
 
 When, some weeks after the change in policy, a query came thorough from the 
Indian government about why Britain had decided on reform, an official from the 
FCO’s South Asian Department decided to sound out the Planning Staff. From them 
she learnt that ‘the change in our policy was a messy business stretching over several 
months and as many files.’ It ‘was also the subject of a great deal of opposition from 
officials, notably several of the Legal Advisers.’88 Anyone reading the relevant 
documents is likely to echo these thoughts. It certainly had been a long, drawn out and 
divisive affair but, arguably, for good reasons. There was certainly hard evidence in 
favour of the legal experts’ doubts about change in the early 1970s. For one thing, 
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there was genuine confusion over what the policy of individual EC members was on 
recognition. While Paris almost instantly entered into dealings with Pinochet’s regime 
in 1973, Belgium and Germany took longer to do so, while in Italy there was 
considerable heart-searching partly because, as in Britain, there was popular revulsion 
over the ousting of an elected President.89 Nonetheless, Britain was undoubtedly in a 
minority position and most EC members had similar policies to France whose 
approach, was well suited to a world where colonial empires were in retreat, even if it 
had problems where civil wars made it difficult to tell who held effective power.  
 
Looked at in retrospect, time, as always, worked in favour of reform. The 
embarrassments caused by cases like Chile and Greece, the need to work with EC 
partners, changes in US practice and the sheer frequency of violent changes of regime 
worldwide, all made change desirable. Diplomats on the ground were increasingly 
aware that ‘French’ practice (actually based on the earlier Estrada doctrine) had real 
benefits where the presentation of policy was concerned when the time came to deal 
with unsavoury dictators. Even under Douglas-Home and Callaghan, ministers 
showed signs of sharing the desire for change, but only under Thatcher did key 
figures like Gilmour and Carrington have the determination to push reform through. 
Even as late as September 1979, the debate seemed finely balanced, but Gilmour in 
particular was prepared to use his authority to insist on reform. The reform had its 
limits. In particular, the criteria on which Britain decided to deal with any new 
regime, remained largely the same. But in future, by avoiding a formal announcement 
of such decisions, the government might neatly avoid public debate over them. 
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